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The Valour and the Horror
Controversy and the Official
History of the RCAF, Volume 3
David Bercuson and Syd Wise

T

he publication ofVolume 3 of the Official
History of the Royal Canadian Air Force

by Brereton Greenhous, Stephen J. Harris,
William C. Johnston and William G.P. Rawling,
(University of Toronto Press, 1994)
reawakened the media controversy over The
Valour and the Horror, particularly that related
to the "Death by Moonlight" episode. Although
there are certain similarities in approach
between the Official History and the film,
some of them superficial and some of them
not, the differences are far more significant
than the similarities. Volume 3 is in fact a
comprehensive and well-documented history
of the RCAF's overseas operations in the
Second World War; the RCAF's role in the
bombing offensive occupies 344 of 909 pages
of text. Though much of this section is taken
up with the origins and history ofNo.6 (RCAF)
Group, the authors also examine the origins
of the RAF's bombing philosophy in the 19191939 period, and trace the evolution and
execution of RAF bombing policy during the
war.
The merits of this volume of the RCAF
history were not what caught the attention of
the media (which, by contrast, had all but
ignored the first two volumes of the history).
Rather, it was because the authors appeared
to be arguing that Sir Arthur Harris' accession
to the leadership of Bomber Command in
1942 that brought a decided shift to "area"
bombing aimed at destroying German morale
by killing, wounding and "de-housing" as
many German city dwellers as possible,
especially in industrial cities. Such a

conjuncture was precisely the argument of
The Valour and the Horror. Unlike the film,
however, the authors of Volume 3 show that

the decision to stress area bombing was a
decision of higher command, including the
British War Cabinet, and that it came about
because of several factors. including longheld theories about the potential impact of
bombing upon enemy morale; the inability of
the RAF to make precision attacks at night;
the strongly-held desire of the British (and
Canadians, if poll results presented in the
book are a valid measure) to pay the Germans
back for their own area bombing of London,
Coventry and other centres; and the powerful
necessity of making some important
contribution to the war in the west while the
forces of the Soviet Union were fighting and
dying in large numbers in the east. In short,
while the official history offers a complexand surely valid-explanation of the onset of
area bombing, The Valour and the Horror did
not, preferring to account for the strategy in
its depiction of the devil-figure Arthur Harris.
Yet there is a sense in which the two
accounts of the bomber offensive coincide.
Both Volume 3 of the official history and
"Death by Moonlight" elaborate a common
central point: that British and Canadian
aircrew were deliberately sent out, night after
night, to kill innocent Germans, with little
benefit to the war effort. At its crudest, the
argument of both is that the RAF and RCAF
killed Germans just for the sake of killing
Germans. The impact of this contention is
perhaps stronger in Volume 3 of the official
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history because it is, after all, an elaborately
researched and documented official history.
The melancholy conclusion its team of authors
reach in assessing the bombing role is that
"the Combined Bomber Offensive (by both the
RAF /RCAF and the United States Army Air
Force) against Germany did not begin to meet
its objectives-the progressive, if not sudden,
decline in enemy war production and, later,
civilian morale-until the last months of 1944,
four full years after it began in earnest."
(pp.865-867)
It should be noted that although the
authors assert in the sentence quoted here
that the strategic bombing offensive began in
1940, it was 1942 that was the true beginning
of the offensive, according to the authors
themselves. It was this contention-the
combination of frightfulness and pointless
sacrifice-that attracted the media, and
appeared to offer vindication for the position
taken by the McKennas in The Valour and the
Horror.

We believe it is precisely here that Volume
3 of the official history is most open to
criticism. But before taking up that point we
should state that this book has many real
strengths. It is well written and almost
invariably interesting. Divided into sections
on Air Policy, The Fighter War, The Maritime
Air War, The Bomber War, and Air Transport,
it gives a remarkably complete overview of the
massive and varied Canadian air effort in
overseas theatres during the Second World
War. The Bomber War section is especially
valuable for the technical detail it supplies on
bombing operations, aircraft and the course
of actual missions. An outstanding merit of
this section is the analysis of the war of
electronic measures and counter-measures,
a major feature of the night-bombing
campaign. The description of this aspect of
the bomber war is probably the best short
account that has appeared in print.
Yet there are problems with Volume 3 of
the official history, particularly in its
treatment of the strategic bombing offensive.
The authors are almost obsessively concerned
to establish that Harris' sole aim in the
offensive was to destroy German cities and

kill German civilians. But this is contested
by no credible historian; it has long been
well-established that the German population
and the morale of the German people were
prime targets of Bomber Command. The real
puzzle was why the air staff believed so firmly
in the fragility of civilian morale, yet this
question is never raised in Volume 3 of the
official history. (The roots of this belief are to
be found in the RAF staff in 1917-1918, and
may in part be connected with an upper class
perception of the emotional volatility of the
industrial working classes-a mistaken
assumption if there ever was one.)
The assault on German civilians and their
morale was by no means the only endeavour
engaged in by Bomber Command, which in
fact waged a multifaceted campaign against
industrial targets, rail and communications
systems, aircraft manufacturing plants and
other war material industries, oil refineries,
and so on. All this is carefully detailed in
Volume 3 of the official history, at the same
time as the authorial team condemns Harris
for being so single-minded about area
bombing. Sometimes Harris selected targets
other than cities of his own volition; sometimes
at the suggestion of his seniors, such as
Portal and Eisenhower. This contradiction,
which runs through the bombing section of
Volume 3, suggests that the authors took
literally Harris' bombastic rhetoric, as in his
letter to the Undersecretary of State for Air of
25 October 1943 in which he declared that
the aim of RAF bombing was, quite simply,
"the destruction of German cities, the killing
of German workers and the disruption of
civilised community life throughout
Germany." (pp. 724-25) If Harris was so rigidly
committed to these objectives, as the authors
believe, then why the varied missions mounted
by Bomber Command?
The likely answer is that Harris shared
the inconsistencies which overtake all of us,
including senior commanders. He made
compromises, he was susceptible to pressures
from others, and occasionally he changed his
mind or was ready to try new approaches.
Moreover, Harris was not Bomber Command,
only its Air Officer Commanding in Chief.
Volume 3 of the official history reduces
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Bomber Command to a one-man show. It is
to be regretted that the kind of sophisticated
analysis of the many factors making up
American bombing policy (and its many
contradictions) to be found in Conrad C.
Crane's Bombs, Cities and Civilians: American
Airpower Strategy in World War II (Lawrence:
University of Kansas Press, 1993) are missing
in this volume.
In another respect the approach taken by
the authors of this volume of the official
history intersects with that of the producers
of The Valour and the Horror. Both conclude
that the bomber offensive did not achieve the
objectives of its proponents. In two or thre
paragraphs tacked on to the end of the Bomber
War section, a series of considerations are
listed which attest to the importance of the
bombing offensive, whether as establishing a
"Second Front" when no other means was
available to do so diverting substantial
German manpower and war material to air
defence at the cost of German armies in the
field. But given the weight of the narrative,
these paragraphs are perfunctory and appear
almost as afterthoughts.

is still out on the actual impact of the bombing
offensive upon Germany and on the outcome
of the war itself; it cannot be said that Volume
3 of the official history has contributed much
to the matter.
It would be hard to say whether the stance
taken by the authors on the bombing offensive
derives in part from a moral revulsion against
the form that offensive took. At one point
(p.843) the authors refer to the "moral
ambiguity" of area bombing against German
cities, but nowhere in their section on the
Bomber War is there either a moral or legal
discussion of the issues raised by an air war
levied against civilian populations. Scot
Robertson, in his essay on the strategic
bombing offensive elsewhere in this book,
confronts these questions directly. Indeed,
the authors of Volume 3 at the very least do
not contend that German cities were "open"
and "undefended"; their discussion of
Luftwaffe defensive measures is admirably

What grounds do the authors have for
their conclusions about the effectiveness of
the Combined Bomber Offensive? There is no
scholarly assessment of the United States
share of that offensive, nor is there any
discussion of the differing views that exist on
the overall offensive. Nearly half a century
after the compilation of the British and
American strategic bombing surveys, the
authors of Volume 3 accepted the view of
some authorities on the meaning of that body
of evidence-authorities well known for the
opinion that the campaign was a failure-and
ignore the evidence brought forward by other
authorities of a different view.
Neither
Williamson Murray nor Richard Overy, for
example, are cited, yet their research pointed
to the conclusion that the RAF offensive had
a significant impact on the course of the war.
There is, in sum, a remarkable contrast
between the quality of analysis made by the
authors on bombing operations and German
defensive measures, and the lack of analysis
in assessing the value of the campaign of
which these operations were a part. The jury
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thorough, and heavy Canadian aircrew losses
are a testimony to the effectiveness of the
German air defence system.
In the concluding pages of the Bomber
War section, the authors quote from an
editorial of the Globe & Mail of 23 March 1945
(p.864). The editorial, after asserting that the
bomber offensive had crippled the German
economy, contended that "the real victory of
Allied air power" was "a thing of the mind-a
lesson so terrible as never to be forgotten ...
. The German people will not need the presence
of Allied armies to persuade them that they
lost this war. The storm which is sweeping
them from the air. ... is convincing them that
they have suffered the most terrible defeat
ever inflicted on a people in all history." Out
of this, the Globe hoped, would come a resolve
by the people of Germany to live
"constructively and compatibly alongside
[their] neighbours."

This excerpt from The Valour and the Horror
Revisited, edited by Bercuson and Wise, has been
reprinted with the permission of MeGill-Queen's
University Press.

David Bercuson is Professor of History
and Dean of Graduate Studies at the
University of Calgary. He is the author of
True Patriot: The Life of Brooke Claxton,
1898-1960 ( 1994) (reviewed in this issue) .
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of National Defence. He authored Volume
1 of the Official History of the Royal
Canadian Air Force: Canadian Airmen
and the First World War (University of
Toronto Press, 1980).

The comment by the authors of this official
history is deeply revealing oftheir interpretive
position. "If that were the case," they wrote,
"then the long casualty lists the Globe had
published over the last five years would have
some meaning." The whole thrust of Volume
3 of the official history is that the bomber
offensive was a misguided failure, and that
the deaths of 9,919 Canadians in Bomber
Command were essentially meaningless in
the total picture of the war.
But surely the Globe editorial was
fundamentally correct. No event other than
the final surge of the Red Army into Berlin
brought the war home more crushingly to the
German people than the long-sustained
bomber offensive with its terrible casualties
and immense damage. They knew, and their
postwar, post-Nazi leaders knew, that
Germany could not suffer another war as
terrible as the Second World War and the
German state would have to take a new path.
Out of this realization came the Schuman
Plan of 1950, the European Economic
Community of 1957 and the European
Community of today. Out of it also came the
emergence of a democratic and responsible
Germany in full partnership and alliance
with the states that once had bombed it.
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